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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1959
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
Member of the Denver firm of Sears and Goldsmith
Instructor, University of Denver College of Law
As usual there were, during 1958, a large number of cases in the
broad general field of contracts. Some of the cases could be discussed
under more than one heading. These cases prove that basic contract
problems can plague courts' as well as lawyers.
CONSIDERATION-INCLUDING JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT AND A POSSIBLE
NOVATION
At least five cases dealt directly with the subject of consideration for
a promise. In Rhodes v. Haberstich' suit was brought for return of a
deposit paid on a contract to purchase certain personal property in-
cluding a hotel business. The purchasers contendedthat a provision of
the contract requiring the sellers to return the deposit in case they failed
or refused to close meant that the sellers had not bound themselves to
perform but could, at their option; return the deposit and terminate the
contract. In reversing a judgment entered for the plaintiff the supreme
court held that these were mutual promises of sale and purchase which
were consideration for each other. Each party was bound to perform.
The sellers' duty to return the deposit was not the purchasers' exclusive
remedy for breach by the sellers. The purchasers could have waived re-
turn of the deposit and sued for specific performance.
In the case of Lindsay v. Marcus' the supreme court held that when
the mutual promises of joint venturers were exchanged, even though
one party put up no cash, the joint venture was consummated. Lindsay,
Marcus and Holland entered into a joint venture to purchase and de-
velop certain real property on which Lindsay already held a purchase
option. Lindsay, aided by Holland, was unsuccessful in his efforts to
secure an amended option, but later Lindsay did consummate the put-
chase on the terms of the original option. The joint venture agreement
was not disclosed to the vendor. After the purchase, Lindsay repudiated
the joint venture agreement. Prior to this repudiation, Marcus and
Holland had tendered performance of their capital contributions but
Lindsay always delayed accepting them. In affirming a decree ordering
specific performance of the joint venture agreement, and an accounting,
the supreme court reviewed and amplified the Colorado law on joint
venturers holding: (1) "Equity holds each joint venturer strictly ac-
countable for completing ventures and will not permit the unilateral
withdrawal of one partner to the detriment of his fellow contractors with-
out the consent of the latter,"' (2) Prior to termination or abandonment
of the joint venture, one coadventurer cannot exclude the others by
acquiring an interest in the property in his own name. If so acquired
the property will be treated as held in trust for the coadventurers, and
I In reviewing the 1958 cases it was observed that one district ludge was reversed five times an an
equal number of writs of error to review his judgments in cases Involving contracts.
a326 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1958).
S325 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1958).
' Id. at 270.
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(3) only slight evidence sustains the claim of a fiduciary's failure to
perform his duty to the principal.
The supreme court dealt with another problem of especial interest
to the legal profession in holding that the occasional prior legal services
rendered by Holland for Lindsay did not create a fiduciary relationship
between them in regard to the entry into the joint venture agreement.
Neither this case nor a case decided in 1957' dealt with the right of one
joint venturer to withdraw from the joint venture when a coadventurer
refuses or neglects to perform his duties.
An example of consideration for a promise being rendered to a per-
son other than the promisor' is furnished by Reilly v. Korholz.' Here the
plaintiff financed a then current payrcll of Rock Wool Insulating Com
pany and later arranged for an additional $100,000 financing for the
company thereby preventing the company from being bankrupt. The
defendants had requested these acts and in exchange had promised to
to transfer 833 1/3 shares of their own capital stock in the company to
Korholz, without payment, and to vote their stock so as to elect Korholz
president of the company and chairman of its board of directors. Over a
month later, in an independent promise, the defendants promised to
transfer certain claims against the company and their remaining 507 1/6
shares of capital stock to Korholz as trustee.
When Korholz sued to enforce the promises, the trial court held that
Korholz was entitled to outright ownership of 833 1/3 shares, and to
transfer of the claims and the 507 1/6 shares to his name as "trustee,"
without defining the terms of the trust. The supreme court refused to
hold that the promise to vote the stock was illegal under the statute of
the state (not Colorado) in which the contract was made. It held that
the promise to vote the stock, if illegal, was severable from the promise
to transfer the stock. The promise to transfer the claims and the 507 1/6
shares to Korholz as "trustee" was held not supported by any considera-
tion and the trial court was reversed on this point. The partial reversal
appears correct since no bargained-for exchange of performance was
shown to support this later promise.
Granberry v. Wright" would seem to be just another illustration of
an act as consideration for a promise but is worthy of note for the dictum
of the supreme court to the effect that the trial judge apparently fell into
error in seeking to satisfy both sides. The trial court had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint on a promissory note, and the defendant's counter-
claim for damages arising out of an alleged nonperformance of the
services in consideration of which the note was given. The supreme court
held that the dismissal of the counterclaim should be regarded as a
finding that the services for which the note was given had been per-
formed. Accordingly, judgment was reversed for the plaintiff.
Justice Frantz' dissent in Richie v. Phillebaum' makes it worthwhile
to examine this case. The decision affirms a trial court's decree ordering
foreclosure of a trust deed and the entry of judgment for attorneys fees.
The defendant, in consideration of his mortgagee's allowing him to re-
move and sell a deposit of sand, promised to pay, on his note, $5,000 of
the proceeds realized on such sale and further promised to refinance the
5 Smaller v. Leach, 136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (19571.
e See Restatement, Contracts § 75 (2) (1932).
7 320 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1958).
8 320 P.2d 979 (Colo. 19581.
e 324 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1958).
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note within ninety days after sale of the sand. The $5,000 was paid, but
the defendant failed to refinance. When the note fell into default, the
foreclosure suit was brought. Justice Frantz, in his dissent, applied the
theory that the permission given by the mortgagee, coupled with the
sale and $5,000 payment by the mortgagor, supports a substituted con-
tract whereby the note and trust deed were "novated" leaving only an
unperformed obligation to refinance. If this were so, no attorneys fees
would be collectible and the instant suit should have been dismissed.
The possibility that a novation, in its broader sense1" could be found in
a case like this is intriguing. The majority opinion is consistent with a
theory (not expressly mentioned) that the agreement of the mortgagee
and mortgagor only resulted in a partially performed executory accord.
Viewed in this light, upon failure to refinance the mortgagee had the
right to elect to sue on the promise to refinance, or proceed, as he did,
to seek foreclosure and attorneys fees, under the note and trust deed.
INTERPRETATION AND REFORMATION OF CONTRACT
Some of the recent cases deal with questions of interpretation and
concern matters that are of frequent interest to the legal profession. In
Culley v. Grand Junction Legion Building Corp." the supreme court
held that a lessee, who had the right to buy the leased premises at the
"best bona fide offer" the lessor might be willing to accept, was not en-
titled to recover the amount of a real estate broker's commission which
was included in the price the lessor communicated to the lessee and the
lessee paid to the lessor. The contract did not call for communication of
the best "net" offer.
In Pullen Motors v. Thompson" the defendant's auto was repossessed
by the motor company and sold for part cash and a traded-in auto. The
trade-in was sold at auction. The motor company sued for the deficiency
after deducting the cash sale prices of both cars. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's holding that the language of the chattel mort-
gage requiring net proceeds of the "money arising from the sale""' to
be applied on the defendant's debt permitted only a cash sale of the
repossessed car.
The case of Moddelmog v. Cook'" involved the right of a purchaser
of real estate to recover his down payment when the vendor could not de-
liver title "free and clear of all taxes, liens and encumbrances" with cer-
tain stated exceptions. The alleged encumbrance was a right-of-way and
easement for an irrigation ditch over the property. The ditch was visible,
seen and discussed by the purchasers before the contract was signed. The
vendors had secured dismissal of the complaint following a decree of the
trial court that the contract be reformed by inserting the following: "con-
veyance to be subject to lateral ditch across said property." In reversing
the trial court and permitting the purchasers to rescind and recover their
deposit the supreme court declared that under the rule of Eriksen v.
Whitescarver!5 a covenant to convey free and clear of liens and encum-
brances applies not only to unknown, but, in the absence of a showing
to the contrary, to known encumbrances. The contract was complete and
10Ames, Novation, in Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts (19311; Restatement, Contracts § 424
(1932).
"1331 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1958).
"2331 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1958).
13 Id. at 1103.
15330 P.2d 1113 1Colo. 19 14).I5 57 Colo. 409, 142 Pac. 413 (1914).
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unambiguous. The supreme court held that reformation is to be allowed
only where a "mutual mistake is proved,"' " but that this was not a case of
such mistake.
The case of Nolan v. Colorado Mortgage Co."7 is noteworthy in
that the court referred to "gross negligence" of an escrow agent as hav-
ing been proved and as being the basis for holding the agent responsible
for damages arising out of its nonperformance of duties as escrowee.
The defendant for valuable consideration undertook to disburse $9,200
of escrowed funds to a building contractor under a contract, between the
plaintiff and the contractor, requiring payment in proportion to work
accomplished on the proposed structure. The work was stopped when
only about one-third done and when only about twenty-six dollars re-
mained in escrow. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
was reversed. The facts and reasoning of the supreme court clearly
demonstrate a breach of the escrowee's contract duties. However, noth-
ing is gained by the reference to "gross negligence," especially since
previous cases have held that Colorado does not recognize degrees of
negligence," and this is neither a tort case, nor a case involving a
gratuitous bailee for the sole benefit of the bailor.
INTEREST As DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENTLY INDUCING CONTRACT
The language of two cases, Moreland v. Austin"° and Doenges-Long
Motors, Inc. v. Gillen,' may appear to be in conflict. In the former case
the supreme court expressly states, "interest is not recoverable in an action
for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit."' 1 In that case the defend-
ant fraudulently represented that cattle and land he was selling to the
plaintiff were free from disease. In Doenges, a minor fraudulently mis-
represented his age to induce the motor company to sell him a car. The
supreme court allowed the defrauded motor company to recover, among
other damages, an amount equal to the interest, at the legal rate, on
the reasonable value of the automobile the infant had purchased. The
interest ran only during the time the infant retained the automobile.
The cases can be reconciled because in the first case interest on the
damages occasioned by the fraud was denied, in the second case interest
was used only to calculate the principal amount of the damages to be
awarded for detention of the automobile.
INTEREST, ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In Weitzel v. Alles" the contract of purchase and sale of real prop-
erty provided that if it was cancelled by the vendor for breach by the
purchaser, "all payments that shall have been theretofore made . . .
shall be retained by the vendor ... in full liquidation of all damages
sustained by the vendor."" The purchaser had given a note for $2,000
payable April 1, 1956. The contract was declared terminated July 28,
1955. The note was specifically "subject to" the purchase contract and
1e330 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1958).
17322 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1958).
18 Adams v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 49 Colo. 475, 478, 113 Pac. 1010, 1012 (1911). "Degrees of negligence
are not recognized In this jurisdiction.' But cf. Pettlngell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 496, 271 P.2d 1038, 1044
(1954) where our court uses the phrase "some higher degree" referring to negligence and after eliminating
simple negligence as sufficient to support an action under our guest statute.
ie 330 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1958).
20328 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1958).
91 330 P.2d 136, 138 (Colo. 1958).
22322 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1958).
23 Id at 700
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was not a down payment on the property. The supreme court held that
under the contract only actual payments made prior to cancellation
could be retained as liquidated damages. The note was held to be
"but an incident" of the contract and no right to recover thereon
existed after the forfeiture and cancellation of the contract.
In Weaver v. First Nat'l Bank" damages for breach of warranty
included attorneys fees. The purchaser of cattle from the proprietor of
a Colorado licensed livestock ring sued the proprietor, on a third party
complaint, for breach of warranty of title to the cattle. The proprietor
filed additional third party complaints against the person who delivered
the stolen cattle to the ring, the state brand inspector and the bank on
which the proprietor drew his check to pay for the stolen cattle. The
purchaser secured judgment against the proprietor. All other third
party complaints were dismissed. In hearing the writ of error brought
by the proprietor the Colorado Supreme Court held: (1) The proprietor,
under the licensing statute"' warranted title to the cattle, (2) damages
for breach of this warranty include the purchase price paid, attorneys
fees for the purchaser's attorney and interest from the date of judgment
only,' (3) the brand inspector is liable to the proprietor for certifying
title to the cattle without referring to his book of registered and recorded
brands'" to determine their ownership. The third party defendant banks
were held not liable since there was no evidence showing that the pro-
prietor delivered his check to a person who represented himslf to be the
agent of a fictitious payee. A full discussion of the so-called impostor or
fictitious payee rule and its limitations is stated in this case.
The case of Kepler v. Burns" should be of more than "passing in-
terest" to all attorneys. Burns bought certain property from Kepler who
was executor of an estate. In inviting bids on the property Kepler re-
quired 15 per cent in cash to accompany the bid and stated terms of
sale as, "cash upon delivery to purchaser of an executor's deed .. ""
Much later a demand was made for payment of the balance of the price
in cash. Burns paid his cash balance by the required date. Kepler, hav-
ing been later surcharged for failing to collect interest for the period of
more than one year between payment of the 15 per cent and payment
of the balance of the purchase price, sued Burns for this interest. The
supreme court affirmed a dismissal of Kepler's complaint on the ground
that by the terms of the offer, no payment was due from Burns until
the deed was tendered. This is in accord with generally accepted prin-
ciples."
INFANTS' CONTRACTS
The Doenges case'" must be considered at greater length because
it extends previous decisions and settles many elements of damages to
be considered in cases involving disaffirmance of a contract by a minor."
In this case, Gillen, shortly before his twenty-first birthday, bought an
automobile from the motor company, traded in his old car, made a cash
" 330 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1958).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-11-1 to 17 (1953).
eColo. Rev. Stat. 73-1-2 (1953) does not provide interest for breach of warranty.
"Coo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-8 (1953).
2324 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1958).
2" Id. at 786.
"0 Restatement, Contracts § 267 (c) (1932).
3 1328 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1958) see note 20. supra.
"An excellent and detailed case comment on the Doenges case appears in 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 102 (1958).
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payment and financed the balance due. When he became twenty-one
he promptly rescinded the contract, returned the new car and demanded
return of his cash payment and of his trade-in, which had already been
sold. The motor company counterclaimed for damages arising out of
Gillen's fraudulent misrepresentation of his age and alleged that the
misrepresentation estopped Gillen from rescinding. The supreme court
held: (1) the right of an infant to disaffirm his contract is an absolute
right whether he has or has not misrepresented his age and thereby in-
duced another to contract with him; (2) on disaffirmance the contract
is void ab initio;0 (3) Gillen's recovery should be return of the money
he paid plus reasonable value of his old car and interest from date of
delivery (the agreed trade-in value could not be used since the contract
was void ab initio) ; and (4) Gillen is liable for all damages resulting
directly and proximately from his tort of deceit and these damages
consist of the difference between the reasonable value of the purchased
car on the date of its delivery and its reasonable value on the date of its
return, with interest for the period it was withheld.
CONTRACTS INVOLVING MECHANICS' LIENS
In this period of continued expansion of building it is of value to
consider the case of Bishop v. Moore.3" In this case the supreme court
affirmed dismissal of a. suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien stating: "A
prime requisite to the establishment of a valid mechanic's lien is that
an indebtedness exists in favor of the claimant for labor or materials.
Where the labor or materials furnished are in breach of the contract
and so unsatisfactory as to require that either or both be redone at
equal or greater expense, clearly they are without value to the property
owner and do not constitute an indebtedness. . . . Indebtedness is a
prerequisite to any mechanic's lien.
In Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Improvement
Co." the plaintiff subcontractor constructed and paved a roadway partly
over the land of the defendant land company and partly over the land
of others. After the roadway was completed it was dedicated to the
public. The land company had contracted for the construction and had
partly paid the principal contractor. The principal contractor went
bankrupt without paying the subcontractor. 7 In allowing a lien against
33328 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 1958).
34 323 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958).
25 Id. at 899, the court quoting Trustee Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311, 203 P.2d 499 (1949).
"0332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958).
87 Some of the above facts were derived from an exomination of the court file.
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the land company's land, proportionate only to the amount of roadway
adjacent to the land company's land, the trial court concluded: (1) that
the statute 8 only permits a lien upon property to the extent of the value
of labor performed and materials furnished upon the property, and (2)
that the Colorado mechanic's lien statute" does not impose personal
liability on a landowner for the entire amount of the contract when
no lien attaches, nor even when it does unless there is privity of contract
between the contractor and the owner. Here there was no such privity
between Brannan and the land company. Some readers may have run
into the situation of the Denver building and engineering departments
requiring that a developer of land improve land outside the develop-
ment area by installing curb, gutter and street over a dedicated road
as a condition precedent to permitting installation of such improve-
ments adjacent to the developed land. On the basis of Brannan and
another case ,0 it appears that the unfortunate developer, caught in such
a predicament, cannot expect to secure a lien on the land he involun-
tarily improves. Improvements to a previously dedicated roadway, on
public land, will not support a mechanic's lien against the land adjacent
to the road.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
As inferred above, some of the preceding cases could be considered
under this heading; however, the most important case in this field is
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-1 (1953).
.. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-17 (1953).








Myrick v. Garcia." In Myrick the trial court refused to permit the
plaintiff, an endorsee, to place a promissory note of the defendant in
evidence without proof of both the execution and endorsement of the
note to the plaintiff. The supreme court reversed and remanded for
a new trial holding that if three applicable sections of the statutes" are
read together the person having possession of a promissory note which
bears the payee's endorsement is prima facie the owner of the note and
entitled to have it placed in evidence. If the defendant then challenges
this prima facie title the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence
to rebut the challenge to his ownership. Two earlier Colorado cases"
had required that if the execution and/or endorsement are denied in
the answer, the note could not be admitted in evidence until the en-
dorsee offers evidence of the validity of the endorsement by the payee,
and if denied, of the execution of the note. The Myrick case expressly
overrules the two earlier decisions insofar as they are inconsistent with
its result.
In Civic Finance Co. v. Meintzer" the supreme court in a very re-
strained opinion reverses the trial court's judgment which incorrectly
refused to permit a holder in due course for value to recover from an
accommodation maker of the note.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In Walker v. Nelson" the supreme court defines the nature and ob-
ligations of an agistment contract and distinguishes the agistment con-
tract from a lease of pasture land.
The case of Wysowatcky v. Lyons" should be of interest in the field
of contracts and quasi-contracts for a reminder, in a concurring opinion,
that where the value of things or services furnished is common knowledge
the trier of the facts "may determine the question of value from its own
knowledge without the aid of opinion evidence.""
The plaintiff in School District v. Brenton" had achieved "stable
and continuous tenure" under the Colorado Teacher Tenure Act,' as
principal and a teacher of a high school in the defendant district. The
defendant, without reducing the number of teachers, abolished the po-
sition of principal and continued the plaintiff as a teacher at reduced
salary. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plain-
tiff in the amount of the salary reduction. Under the Teacher Tenure
Act" the defendant could not cancel the plaintiff's contract or reduce
his salary except in accord with the act.
"1 332 P.2d 900 (Colo. 19581.
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. I§ 95-1-63, 31, 59 (1953) which to the extent here pertinent read as follows: "A person
placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor shall be deemed to be
an endorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
The endorsement must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto. The signature of
the endorser, without additional words, is a sufficient endorsement.- (emphasis supplied) *'Every holder is
deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course."
43Marks v. Munson, 59 Colo. 440, 149 Pac. 440 (1915) and Middlesex Co. v. Jacobs, 87 Colo. 445, 290
Pac. 784 (1930), both cited in Myrick.
"4328 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1958).
"5327 P.2d 285 (Colo. 1958).
ue 328 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1958)'
4' In re Hartle's Estate, 236 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Mo. App. 1951) (cited in instant cael.
4323 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1958).
":Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 123-8-1 (1953).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 123-8-7 (1953) provides for cancellation of an employment contract of a teatie on
continuous tenure . . . for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, justifiable decrease
in the number of teacher positions, or other good and just cause .... "" None of the grounds were present.
The alleged reason for cancellation of the contract was to conserve finances of the district, but actually one
or two new teachers were employed.
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